On March 23, 2026, the Corruption, Networks, and Transnational Crime Research Center (CONTRA) at the Schar School of Policy and Government was formally launched with From Cartels to Combatants: The Intensifying Militarization of America’s Drug War. The conference—as part of the School’s tenth anniversary celebration—convened policy experts, scholars, and practitioners to examine the evolving U.S. approach to transnational criminal organizations, with a focus on the legal, operational, and strategic implications of applying counterterrorism frameworks in this domain. Discussions addressed the consequences of designating such organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including implications for intelligence use, legal authorities, and cross-border policy coordination. The summaries below reflect the principal themes of the discussion.
Debating New Tools Against Cartels
The conference examined the evolving U.S. approach to combating organized crime, particularly the designation of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Convened by the CONTRA center on its 10th anniversary, it brought together experts from law enforcement, academia, and civil society to assess the legal, diplomatic, operational, and strategic implications of this shift.
Opening remarks highlighted the transformation of U.S. counternarcotics policy over the past decade—from a predominantly law enforcement–driven model targeting cartel leadership to an increasingly militarized approach. Speakers emphasized that TCOs should be understood not merely as criminal entities, but as complex systems embedded within social, economic, and political structures. This framing underscored the need for interdisciplinary approaches drawing on political science, law, international relations, and criminology, alongside the use of advanced data analysis and network-based methodologies.
A brief announcement was also made about an AI policy simulation experiment for which CONTRA students are developing a model that simulates policy debates based on speakers’ documented positions. The opening session also featured excerpts from a documentary by Andrew Glazer, which highlighted enforced disappearances of civilians during military operations by Mexican special forces in Nuevo Laredo in 2018, raising important concerns about accountability and human rights in militarized responses.
Panel I – Operational and Diplomatic Implications
Panel I explored the operational and diplomatic implications of applying counterterrorism frameworks to organized crime. While FTO designation expands authorities—such as enhanced intelligence sharing, sanctions, and asset forfeiture—it also presents significant challenges. Intelligence generated through national security channels is often not admissible in court, creating a gap between detection and prosecution. Moreover, tensions persist between military “kinetic” approaches and the slower, evidence-based processes of law enforcement. While military interventions may disrupt armed cartel structures, prosecutorial strategies particularly directed to those holding public office remain essential for dismantling financial networks and addressing corruption.
Participants emphasized the importance of hybrid approaches that integrate security and law enforcement tools, strengthen cross-border cooperation, and align policy objectives between partner countries. Discussions also highlighted that corruption and governance weaknesses continue to underpin the resilience of TCOs, enabling their expansion into diverse economic activities and embedding them within local systems of power.
The role of corruption networks in facilitating drug trafficking was examined in detail, with particular reference to Mexico, where cartels are reported to exert significant influence over local governance, at times functioning as parallel power structures. In some instances, these groups have shaped electoral outcomes and embedded themselves within political institutions. The designation of such organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) could expand the use of anti–money laundering tools to target complicit public officials and their illicit assets, thereby strengthening deterrence and accountability.
It was also noted that traditional tools such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are no longer sufficient to address the scale and complexity of cross-border crime. Strengthening domestic institutional capacity—particularly in investigation, prosecution, and financial intelligence—is critical. Preventive strategies, including community-level interventions to deter youth involvement in criminal networks, were also emphasized.
Finally, participants underscored the importance of targeting the professional enablers of illicit finance, including lawyers, accountants, and financial intermediaries. Greater accountability within financial institutions was seen as essential, with concerns raised that past enforcement actions—such as the case involving HSBC—were insufficient to create meaningful deterrence against future complicity in money laundering activities.
Panel II – Law and Legality
This panel examined the constitutional, statutory, and international legal foundations for the use of military force against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and the precedents such actions may establish. Drawing on historical cases, including the U.S. intervention in Panama and the removal of General Manuel Noriega, the discussion situated current debates within broader traditions of U.S. military engagement.
A central focus was the law of armed conflict, particularly Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states, except in cases of self-defense under Article 51. The panel highlighted the legal ambiguity of applying such frameworks to non-state actors like drug cartels, raising questions about the limits of international law in contemporary security contexts.
Participants also emphasized the risks of militarization, noting that such approaches often rely on confidential decision-making, which may enable opportunistic or unaccountable use of force. Militarization, they argued, sets potentially dangerous precedents and should therefore be applied cautiously.
Recent actions in the Caribbean and against Venezuela were discussed in this context, underscoring the tension between targeting non-state actors and respecting state sovereignty. The panel also noted inconsistencies in the application of legal frameworks such as the Alien Enemies Act.
Finally, from an economic perspective, the inelastic demand for narcotics suggests that supply-side interventions alone are insufficient. Moreover, aggressive enforcement strategies may unintentionally strengthen cartel monopolies, raising questions about the long-term effectiveness of current approaches.
Panel III – Strategic Implications
This panel evaluated the broader strategic consequences—both intended and unintended—of a militarized approach to counternarcotics, focusing on escalation risks, governance impacts, and regional stability. Participants highlighted persistent gaps at both the southern and northern borders, emphasizing the need for policy responses that can keep pace with criminal networks that continually adapt and innovate their business models.
The discussion noted that militarized interventions may result in civilian casualties and disrupt local economic environments, potentially deterring investment and undermining long-term stability. While military force may weaken armed structures, it does not necessarily address the underlying financial and governance systems that sustain transnational criminal organizations.
Panelists emphasized the need to complement military strategies with institutional and policy measures, including:
• Developing tailored legal and operational frameworks suited to transnational crime
• Establishing shared rules, objectives, and coordination mechanisms across jurisdictions
• Enhancing intelligence sharing on money laundering and illicit financial flows
• Decoupling political systems from criminal influence
• Protecting political actors and institutions from coercion and infiltration
• Recognizing corruption as a central enabling factor.
Written by Priya Sahu
Toward a Hybrid Strategy
The recent conference at George Mason University examined the implications of applying a counterterrorism framework to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The discussion underscored a central conclusion: neither traditional law enforcement nor a purely militarized approach is sufficient to address criminal networks that are deeply embedded in licit economic, financial, and political systems.
A hybrid strategy—integrating kinetic operations against cartel leadership and operational nodes with sustained legal and financial pressure against enabling networks—is the most promising path forward. However, such an approach requires confronting difficult issues, including state penetration by criminal actors (notably in Mexico), the limits of existing legal authorities, and the need to target facilitators within legitimate sectors without undermining the rule of law.
I. The Core Analytical Challenge
The application of a counterterrorism paradigm to organized crime reflects a recognition that TCOs now operate at a scale and level of sophistication that implicates national security. However, the analogy is imperfect.
Unlike terrorist organizations, which often rely on external funding streams vulnerable to interdiction, TCOs are self-financing, adaptive, and embedded within licit economies. Their operations span narcotics, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and financial crimes, with value moving through both formal financial systems and global trade networks.
This creates a structural challenge:
The adversary is not external to the system—it is embedded within it.
II. Financial Targeting and the Limits of Current Practice
One of the distinguishing features of U.S. counterterrorism efforts following the September 11 attacks was the aggressive targeting of financial networks. Through tools such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the global standard-setting role of the Financial Action Task Force, the United States was able to constrain terrorist financing at scale.
No comparable effort has been sustained against TCOs. Enforcement has been episodic, often resulting in fines rather than structural consequences for institutions that facilitate illicit flows. This reflects not only policy choices but also the reality that criminal finance is deeply intertwined with legitimate economic activity.
The implication is clear:
Absent sustained and targeted disruption of financial and trade-based networks, kinetic gains will be temporary.
III. Lessons from Plan Colombia
Plan Colombia offers the closest analogue to a successful campaign against a narcotics-driven criminal system. Its effectiveness derived from integration across multiple domains:
- Kinetic pressure on insurgent and cartel leadership
- Financial targeting and disruption of revenue streams
- Strengthening of state institutions
- Intelligence integration across agencies.
- Crucially, Plan Colombia also targeted the broader network of enablers and facilitators, including financial, logistical, and political actors who sustained criminal operations.
However, this experience also highlights a critical boundary condition. Elements of the campaign involved extrajudicial actions against facilitators, including paramilitary violence against suspected collaborators. While such actions may have contributed to short-term disruption, they are incompatible with U.S. legal norms and international standards and cannot serve as a model.
The lesson is not to replicate these methods, but to recognize their functional role:
Network disruption requires targeting not only operators but enablers—through lawful means.
IV. Toward a Hybrid Strategy
The conference discussion converged on the need for a hybrid approach that distinguishes between different components of the TCO ecosystem:
1. Kinetic / Military Tools
Appropriate for:
- Cartel leadership (“kingpins”)
- Operational infrastructure
- High-value targets engaged in violence and trafficking
These actors can be treated, in effect, as combatant-like entities where force may be justified under appropriate legal authorities.
2. Legal and Financial Tools
Essential for:
. Financial institutions facilitating illicit flows
- Professional service providers (law firms, accountants)
- Trade intermediaries and logistics networks
Here, the appropriate framework is not kinetic but legal:
Expanded use of “material support” or “material assistance” doctrines
- Aggressive enforcement against enabling entities
- Targeted sanctions and access restrictions (e.g., dollar clearing)
This distinction is critical:
Kinetic tools degrade operations; legal tools dismantle systems.
V. Mexico: Sovereignty, Penetration, and North American Strategy
No discussion of TCOs can avoid the centrality of Mexico.
There is substantial evidence of criminal penetration of governance structures at local and state levels, with variation across regions. This condition is best understood not as state failure, but as fragmented sovereignty, where authority is contested among state and non-state actors.
This reality complicates policy in two ways:
1. Pressure vs. Partnership
External pressure from the United States can catalyze action
- But excessive or unilateral measures risk undermining legitimacy and cooperation
2. The North American Context
The problem is not solely Mexican:
- Demand, weapons flows, and financial channels are deeply integrated across North America
- Supply chains and trade networks provide both opportunity and vulnerability
The appropriate framework is therefore:
A North American strategy that combines pressure and partnership to address governance penetration and criminal finance at a systemic level.
This includes:
- Joint financial and trade transparency initiatives
- Coordinated law enforcement and intelligence efforts
- Measured use of leverage to incentivize institutional reform
VI. Leadership Targeting: Manuel Noriega vs. Nicolás Maduro
The comparison between the removal of Noriega and the recent operation against Maduro illustrates the limits of leadership-focused strategies.
- Noriega represented a state-centric criminal node; his removal disrupted the governing structure
- Maduro represents a hybrid system, where criminal networks are distributed across state and non-state actors
The implication is:
Leadership removal may be necessary, but is rarely sufficient in networked systems.
This reinforces the need to move beyond decapitation strategies toward systemic disruption.
VII. Strategic Implications
Three conclusions emerge:
- Misalignment of Tools and Problem
Current approaches oscillate between law enforcement and military paradigms, neither of which fully addresses embedded criminal networks. - Centrality of Enablers
Financial, professional, and logistical facilitators are the critical nodes sustaining TCOs and must be targeted systematically—within the rule of law. - Integration as Imperative
Effective strategy requires integrating:
- Kinetic operations
- Financial and legal enforcement
- Diplomatic engagement
- Institutional capacity-building
Conclusion
The central question is not whether to treat TCOs as criminal organizations or national security threats. It is whether we can develop a strategy that reflects their true nature as embedded, adaptive, and networked systems.
A hybrid approach—combining targeted kinetic action with sustained legal and financial pressure on enabling networks—offers the most viable path. But its success will depend on political will, international cooperation, and a clear commitment to operating within the rule of law.
The risk is not choosing the wrong tool, but failing to match our tools to the system we are trying to disrupt.
Written by Alan Bersin
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